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ABSTRACT 
 
Tax incentives have been provided in many countries with the ultimate goal of making the cost of 
capital cheaper and thus enabling the development process through the increase of investment 
expenditures. The study of the role of tax incentives in investment spending has been made possible 
through the use of the neoclassical theory of optimum capital accumulation. This theory has been 
used in this article to indicate that incentive provisions may not always be operative at the margin, 
and thus having no effect in  the formulation of the value of depreciation allowances and further on 
the value of the implicit rental price of capital. Variations in the value of the user cost of capital can 
make an investment project cheaper or more expensive in relation to various time periods. This 
could not be proved for the case of Greece. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
s it is known, the flexible accelerator theory and its various variants have indicated as an important 
investment determinant of the optimum capital stock the expected level of production and sales, and 
they have further considered in their exposition a fixed capital-output ratio. A step further is the 
neoclassical theory of optimal capital accumulation, as developed by Jorgenson (1965, 1967, 1974) and his 
associates
1
, in which they attribute a special role to relative prices and tax incentives as important investment 
determinants. 
  
 In relevance to this theory and using Jorgenson’s terminology,  z  represents all those fiscal instruments used 
at different times, which, when reduced to a present value, will provide a means of calculating an implicit cost for 
capital services. The calculated values of  z  have presupposed that firms profits are enough to absorb all the 
allowances available to them. In this article an enquiry is made into restrictions on the availability of tax allowances 
that have been provided over an earlier period in Greece in affecting the value of  z,  and this introduces new grounds 
in the evaluation of incentive provisions through the use of the neoclassical theory. 
 
PRESENT VALUE OF DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCES ON ONE UNIT INVESTMENT,  Z 
 
 When firms are planning their investment projects two important determinants of their investment cost that 
should be considered among others are depreciation allowances and the other tax allowances of tax-free reserves, 
investment deductions and investment allowances. Every incentive system provides for these measures with an 
ultimate goal of making the cost of investment cheaper than it otherwise would have been.  
 
 Using the neoclassical framework, for every unit of investment, the firm is entitled to deduct from taxable 
income in successive years a stream of depreciation allowances, d1, d2, d3,…….,dn, whose present value, denoted by  z,  
is given by 
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with  r  being the rate of discount. 
 
 Given the value of z , if the revenues of a firm are taxed at rate  t,  then tz  will represent the discounted value 
of tax savings which are expected to follow from a unit value of fixed investment. Furthermore, variations in the value 
of  z,  when  t  is constant (or nearly constant, as it is found to be the case in Greece during the sample period), will 
make the implicit rental price of capital (c) vary, thus making an investment project cheaper or more expensive in 
relation to various time periods. 
 
 In Table (1), using the depreciation rates for tax purposes
2
, and for Area A (Athens-Piraeus and surrounding 
areas comprising the Department of Attica), the corresponding values of  z  have been calculated for equipment and 
buildings. It was chosen to report on Area A, since it is believed (and there are a lot of indications to support this 
supposition)
3
 that the representative firm is situated in the Attica Department. The discount rate used was taken to be 
an annual average of the long term loans interest rate for manufacturing, supplied by the Bank of Greece, as 
depreciation deductions are expressed in nominal terms. 
 
The values of  z  for equipment are generally higher than those for buildings given the sorter useful life for 
tax purposes recognized for these assets. In addition one can observe from a diagrammatic representation of the trend 
of  z  since 1950 (see Figures 1 and 2), that most of the time z  has remained virtually constant with no serious 
fluctuations that could cause important changes in the value of the user cost of capital. 
 
OTHER TAX ALLOWANCES AND THE VALUE OF  Z 
 
 The incorporation of any other allowances provided by the tax system can now be introduced. Reference will 
be made at present to tax-free reserves, investment deductions, and investment allowances that have been provided by 
the Greek tax system
4
. One has to consider again the present value of these allowances which will always be related to 
the acquisition value of the assets and not to asset prices prevailing in the period these allowances are calculated. 
Since it has been simply supposed that the current investment outlay is one unit, an investment allowance for example 
will be given as a percentage of the original unit investment expenditure that is deductible from this year’s net profits. 
 
 The provisions for tax-free reserves and investment deductions cannot be incorporated mechanistically into 
the calculation of z. These two provisions are completely dependent on the amount of net profits. A 100 per cent 
deduction of net profits completely deprived tax authorities of any tax revenues from new investments. Similarly, a 50 
per cent deduction of net profits before 1967 for the representative firm, could have had the same results on 
government revenue if one considers also the various depreciation allowances in use at that time
5
. Mainly after 1972, 
when all these net profit deduction provisions were abolished, and the new system of investment allowances started to 
be applied, corporate tax-revenues began to increase substantially given also that no investment allowances were 
available for the representative firm of Area A.  
 
 Considering the amount of investment deductions claimed in each year, and the corresponding yearly figures 
of investment expenditures, one could find the actual values  of investment allowances applied each year, but these 
figures could have had no practical meaning, being ex post to the entrepreneur who was interested in planning his 
investment policy on the tax incentive provisions that actually affected the value of his implicit rental price of capital.  
 
 If one denotes by λ the value of investment allowance (started to be applied after 1973) that could be claimed 
on every unit of investment expenditure, then  
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since, according to the Greek incentive system, investment allowances could be claimed in addition to depreciation 
allowances.  
 
 
Table 1: 
Present Value Of Depreciation Allowances On A Unit Investment In Equipment And Buildings, 
Area A, 1950-1982 
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1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
19541 
19542 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
19821 
19822 
0.2000 
0.2000 
0.2000 
0.2000 
0.2000 
0.1400 
0.1400 
0.1400 
0.1400 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.2100 
0.1875 
0.1875 
0.1875 
0.1875 
0.1875 
0.1875 
0.1875 
0.1875 
01875 
0.1875 
0.1800 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
5.00 
7.14 
7.14 
7.14 
7.14 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
4.76 
5.33 
5.33 
5.33 
5.33 
5.33 
5.33 
5.33 
5.33 
5.33 
5.33 
5.35 
0.7209 
0.7209 
0.7209 
0.7209 
0.7582 
0.7525 
0.7803 
0.7525 
0.7525 
0.7991 
0.8429 
0.8635 
0.8635 
0.8635 
0.8635 
0.8635 
0.8635 
0.8522 
0.8522 
0.8522 
0.8522 
0.8522 
0.8522 
0.8522 
0.8666 
0.8119 
0.8119 
0.8119 
0.8119 
0.7985 
0.7385 
0.6639 
0.6639 
0.6989 
0.6707 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.0750 
0.0750 
0.0750 
0.0750 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1125 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.1000 
0.0960 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
13.33 
13.33 
13.33 
13.33 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
8.89 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.42 
0.5650 
0.5650 
0.5650 
0.5650 
0.6145 
0.5538 
0.5853 
0.5538 
0.5538 
0.6484 
0.7056 
0.7334 
0.7334 
0.7334 
0.7334 
0.7334 
0.7334 
0.7181 
0.7181 
0.7181 
0.7181 
0.7181 
0.7181 
0.7181 
0.6635 
0.6015 
0.6015 
0.6015 
0.6015 
0.5867 
0.5232 
0.4494 
0.4494 
0.4833 
0.4844 
12.00 
12.00 
12.00 
12.00 
10.00 
10.00 
9.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
7.92 
7.00 
7.00 
7.00 
7.00 
7.00 
7.00 
7.50 
7.50 
7.50 
7.50 
7.50 
7.50 
7.50 
8.25 
10.50 
10.50 
10.50 
10.50 
11.09 
13.92 
18.00 
18.00 
16.00 
16.00 
Source: For depreciation rates see incentive laws reported in text. For discount rates see Bank of Greece, Monthly  
Statistical Bulletin, various issues. 
_________________ 
1First two quarters,   
2Last two quarters. 
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Figure 1:Value Of Z For Manufacturing Investment In Equipment, Area A,1950-1982 
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Figure 2: Value Of Z For Manufacturing Investment In Buildings, Area A,1950-1982 
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 Using the various investment allowance percentages supplied by the various incentive laws in effect at that 
time and for the representative firm of Area A
6
, the following new values of  z  are found. 
 
 Since investment allowances entitle the firm to deduct a specific proportion of the original cost of the asset, 
without requiring this proportion to be deducted from the depreciable base of the asset in the following years (as it is 
the case with initial allowances), the summation of investment allowances and annual allowances (formula 3 above) 
can quite well be greater than one. This is indeed the case for the value of z for equipment in years 1974, 1975 and 
1978. These values could mean, if they are in fact operative
7
, that a unit of current investment entitles the firm to 
deduct from its net profits greater amount than the cost of the asset itself. The case could become more intensified if 
the greater percentages of investment allowances for regions other than Area A are applied. 
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Table 2: 
The Value Of Z Including Investment Allowances 
 
Year Equipment Buildings 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982* 
1.2119 
1.2119 
 
 
1.0485 
0.9885 
0.9139 
0.8639 
0.8989 
 
 
 
 
0.8367 
0.7732 
0.6994 
0.6494 
0.6833 
Source: Table (1) and incentive laws as reported in note No 6. 
______________________ 
*First two quarters. 
 
 
NET PROFITS AND INVESTMENT ALLOWANCES 
 
 The derivation of a time series of  z  values for the Greek manufacturing industry presupposed that all firms 
faced the same discount rate and their profits were enough to absorb the allowances available to them. But what if one 
of these conditions does not hold? In this section the inoperative nature of investment allowances in relation to net 
profits for the Greek corporation will be shown, providing thus a new base for a further assessment of the Greek tax 
incentive structure. The fundamental point reached in this section is that profit restrictions could have been a binding 
constraint which may have prevented investment allowances from being claimed on marginal projects. The 
inoperative nature of investment allowances is suggested by comparing manufacturing investment outlays and the 
maximum amount of net profits that could be deducted each year for investment expenditures. The later figures 
(derived from the application of tax allowances to the amount of net profits as defined by Greek law) were found to be 
on average much lower than gross investment realized each year, suggesting the ineffectiveness of incentive 
provisions at the margin.  
 
 It should be acknowledged that the following discussion suggests and does not prove that Greek incentives 
were ineffective during the 1958-1980 period. The comparisons required for such a suggestion have been made on an 
aggregate level and with respect to a (hypothetical) representative firm as is usually done in the literature. It is 
admitted that the representative firm scenario avoids all serious aggregation problems, but for our case there was 
unfortunately no data on the distribution of profits among firms to provide any additional evidence on the issue under 
investigation. It could have been possible of course that even when aggregate profits were low, some firms had high 
profits (where incentives could have been operative) while others had had negative profits (where incentives could not 
affect their marginal investment decisions). What is true of the ‘representative firm’ need not apply to all firms. No 
absolute proof on the matter can be given. We continue the discussion in the present section bearing in mind that 
aggregate figures have been used throughout all comparisons. 
  
 For the derivation of net profits, it is specified by the Greek tax law
8
 that investment allowances applied on 
investment outlays ‘shall be deducted from net profits’ which are further defined as those ‘shown in the books after 
deducting provisions for ordinary reserves, compulsory distribution of dividends to shareholders or payments to 
partners in the case of personal or individual companies or limited liability partnerships’.  
 
 Legal or statutory reserves should account for five per cent of a company’s profits, and are set aside each 
year until this reserve amounts to one-third of share capital. Compulsory dividend should be, each year, at least six per 
cent of paid-up capital. 
 
 Data for net income and dividend distribution of Greek owned corporations are provided annually by the 
National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) in its ‘Declared Income Statistics of Legal Entities’. These figures 
referring to manufacturing and other sectors of economic activity cover Greek owned corporations while our concern 
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at present is on large scale manufacturing (irrespective of legal form). Data on manufacturing in the above sense are 
reported in the NSSG’s ‘Annual Industrial Surveys’. But while complete data on industrial production, employment, 
and asset formation are reported in these surveys, no figures for net or even gross profits and dividend distribution are 
provided. To derive first a gross profit series we have used the reported data on value-added for large scale 
manufacturing (i.e. establishments employing more than ten people). When total consumption of raw materials, 
packing materials, spare parts, fuel, electric energy, etc., are deducted from gross production value, the derived figure 
of value-added further reduced by the labor costs will give us a good approximation of gross profits. For the amount 
of labor costs care has been taken to include, in addition to annual remuneration of wage earners and salaried 
employees, the corresponding employer’s social insurance contributions9. 
 
 This gross profit figure in addition to depreciation will include also other ‘various expenses’, as interest 
payments, marketing expenses, administrative expenses, etc. Since the NSSG’s Surveys do not report specifically on 
these expenses, reference was made to corresponding data from the Federation of Greek Industries (FGI) for a final 
derivation of net profits before dividend distribution
10
. A linear regression was run on the last data between general 
expenses and gross profits to define the relative percentage to be used in the NSSG’s gross profit data. General 
expenses (including depreciation) were found to be 90 per cent of gross profits, while this percentage was reduced to 
70 per cent when depreciation was excluded from general expenses
11
. General expenses covering 90 per cent of gross 
profits is indeed a very large amount and hardly represents reality but this is indeed the situation in Greek practice 
where entrepreneurs can virtually put into this category of ‘various expenses’ whatever expenses they can think of, 
within of course the limits of the law, so that they can reduce profits to the smallest possible amount. For our purposes 
of the derivation of net profits, since the law specifically states as net profits to be those ‘shown in the books’, we 
have to abide by the previous derivation since this will be the figure on which  further reductions will be made by the 
application of investment allowances.  
 
 To have the net profit figure before the application of investment allowances, dividend distribution have also 
to be deducted. Since no dividend figures are supplied by the NSSG’s Surveys, reference to data from the Federation 
of Greek Industries was made. This indicated that around 7 per cent of gross profits (being the main determinant in 
payout decisions) were allocated each year for dividends
12
. So, using the total 97 per cent (90 per cent general 
expenses
13, and 7 per cent dividends) on the NSSG’s gross profits data we have derived in Table (3), Column 2, the 
required net profits series. The immediate task is to compare them with the amounts of investment expenditures 
undertaken in relevant years. The available statistics for large scale  manufacturing and for new items plus any 
imported used items
14, which represent the ‘productive investments’ as required by the various incentive laws, are 
given for the years 1958-1977 and are reproduced in Column 1 of Table (3). The percentages of investment 
deductions
15
 up to 1972 were applied then to net profit figures, giving thus the maximum amounts of net profits that 
would be deducted each year for investment expenditures. These figures were much lower than gross investment 
(compare Columns 1 and 5) indicating for the representative firm the ineffectiveness of these incentive provisions on 
marginal investments (i.e. investments at the margin, towards which the incentive structure is referred). In other 
words, marginal investments were not benefiting from any investment deductions while at the same time the 
government was losing revenues.  
 
 After 1972 we have investment allowances that were applied for the representative firm in the years 1974, 
1975, and in the years after 1978. For 1974 and 1975 the investment allowances were applicable only to gross 
investment for machinery. In addition the incentive laws imposed a restriction on the maximum permissible amount 
that could be deducted from net profits. Applying these specifications it is found again (compare Columns 5 and 7) 
that the amounts of net profits were not enough to absorb the available investment allowances. In other words 
investment allowances were not operative at the margin for the (hypothetical) representative firm. 
 
 Examining the operative nature of investment allowances on a regional level, it is obvious that the procedure 
could have been as before if there were available figures for investment and net profits for the various Areas. Since 
these were not available, another method was used for comparison. It was calculated for the total of the period what 
percentage on the average net profits bear to the amount of gross investment. This is found to be around 7.4 per cent 
(see Column 3, Table 3). For investment allowances not to be binding the net profit ‘restriction’ had to be 100 per cent 
(or in this case no restriction at all) and the percentage of investment allowances less than 7.4 per cent. But looking at 
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the investment allowance percentages provided by various incentive laws of Areas B, C, D, E, no percentage of 
investment allowance is found less than 7.4 per cent not to mention the net profit restrictions that every so often were 
imposed by the various incentive laws. So, a further proof at the regional level indicates the non operative nature of 
investment allowances. Of course one should admit that this method is very general since investment and profit 
figures that are employed refer to total Greece and no indication is provided on individual Area figures.  
 
 
Table 3: 
Net Profits And Investment Expenditures - Comparison Procedure One 
(In Million Drs, At Current Prices) 
 
 
Year 
Gross 
Invest- 
ment 
 
(1) 
Net 
Profits 
 
(2) 
(2) 
(1) 
 % 
(3) 
Net Profit 
Allow- 
ance% 
(4) 
Tax 
Exempted 
Net Profits 
(5) 
Investment 
Allowances  
Required 
Net 
Profits 
(8) 
Gross 
Profits 
(9) 
(8) 
(9) 
 
(10) 
General 
Ex-
pences3 
(%) 
(11) 
(%) 
(6) 
Amount 
(7) 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
  1342 
  1162 
  1333 
  2083 
  3027 
  2959 
  3268 
  8325 
  4475 
  4695 
  4511 
  5565 
  9094 
12036 
18201 
18593 
138051 
158711 
31250 
31790 
  120  
  135 
  156 
  160 
  182 
  221 
  244 
  291 
  330 
  349 
  406 
  524 
  696 
  784 
  829 
1270 
1537 
1529 
1839 
2061 
 8.9 
11.6 
11.7 
7.7 
6.0 
7.5 
7.5 
3.5 
7.4 
7.4 
9.0 
9.4 
7.7 
6.5 
4.0 
6.8 
6.22 
5.72        
5.9 
6.5 
  --- 
  50.0 
  50.0 
  50.0 
  50.0 
  50.0 
  50.0 
  50.0 
  50.0 
  50.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
  --- 
  50.0 
  50.0 
  --- 
  --- 
 
  --- 
  67.5 
  78 
  80 
  91 
110.5 
122 
145.5 
165 
174.5 
406 
524 
696 
784 
829 
 --- 
768.5 
764.5 
  --- 
  --- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40.0 
40.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5522.0 
6348.4 
  --- 
  2324 
  2666 
  4166 
  6054 
  5918 
  6536 
16650 
  8950 
  9390 
  4511 
  5565 
  9094 
12036 
18201 
  --- 
11044 
12696 
  --- 
  --- 
  3986 
  4505 
  5206 
  5325 
  6071 
  7379 
  8126 
  9702 
11012 
11635 
13539 
17464 
23188 
26122 
27639 
42346 
51225 
50965 
61302 
68687 
 
  51.6 
  51.2 
  78.2 
  99.7 
  80.2 
  80.4 
171.6 
  81.3 
  80.7 
  33.3 
  31.9 
  39.2 
  46.1 
  65.8 
 
  21.5 
  24.9 
 
 
 
 
  44.6 
  44.2 
  71.2 
  92.7 
  73.2 
  73.4 
164.6 
  74.3 
  73.7 
  26.3 
  24.9 
  32.2 
  39.1 
  58.8 
 
  14.5 
  17.9 
 
%         Average 7.4        57.8 
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece, Annual Industrial Surveys, Athens, annual series, Federation of Greek Industries, 
The State of Greek Industry, Athens, annual series, and derivations described in text. 
___________________ 
1 Refers to investment in equipment 
2 Percentages refer to total manufacturing 
3 Percentages of Column (10), reduced by a 7% dividend rate. 
 
 
 To further assess the validity of the above arguments another but less precise data source (that could extend 
the comparisons beyond 1977) was used. The results that were derived were again the same.  These data employed 
directly the net income and dividend distribution figures of the NSSG’s ‘Declared Income Statistics of Legal Entities’ 
series. Taking the figures of ‘total net income after revision’ according to tax legislation and deducting the 5 per cent 
for legal reserves and the amounts of distributed profits in each year, net profit figures were derived to which the 
various investment deductions and investment allowances could be applied (the final figures are  given in Columns 3 
and 4 of Table 4). 
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 These figures refer not only to manufacturing but also to other sectors of economic activity. If reference were 
to be made only to manufacturing the above net profit figures would have to be reduced substantially (even below 50 
per cent since manufacturing and handicraft activities comprise an average 43 per cent
16
 of the total amounts of profits 
made by all sectors). On the other hand, they include only Greek owned corporations and profits from personal 
establishments are excluded. But profits for these establishments can not be so high as to exceed the extra 50 per cent 
increase that was used previously. In addition, in case of inclusion of personal establishments, an extra amount 
referring to payments to partners had to be deducted from net profits thus reducing even more their total amount. 
Secondly, the assumption was made in calculating the net profit figures that legal reserves have not yet amounted to 
one-third of equity. Dropping this assumption is not going to seriously affect the findings due to the smallness of this 
amount. 
 
 Comparisons then were made with the amount of ‘productive investment’ realized each year by large scale 
manufacturing on the same grounds as discussed before. Notice that data in this case are available for comparisons for 
both total Greece and for the Athens-Piraeus Area (otherwise called Greater Athens Area). As Table (4) indicates, for 
total Greece and for the period before 1972 tax exempted net profits were again much  lower than the amounts of 
realized investment (compare Columns 2 and 8) and the same is true for the years following 1972 when an investment 
allowance was available (compare Columns 8 and 11). This suggests once more the inoperative nature of investment 
provisions at the margin. If one wanted to refer to comparisons for the Athens-Piraeus Area, still, with the exemption 
of some few years, the binding nature of investment deductions holds. This is not, though, true for investment 
allowances, but it is speculated that profit figures that are reported for the Athens-Piraeus Area (Column 3) simply 
mean that the companies’ headquarters are in this Area and in reality the reported profits there correspond to branch 
activities in various parts of Greece; the figures of Column 3 in order to represent net profits entirely realized in this 
Area  have to be changed considerably. While the location of investment expenditures can be identified, profit figures 
are difficult to decompose. Comparisons on a regional level indicate that a maximum 36 per cent investment 
allowance had to be in effect to assure a non-binding operation, but obviously no such case existed in the regional 
incentive provisions.  
 
 Since some discrepancy between net profit figures of the two procedures used has been found, which has 
nothing to do of course with the validity of the propositions, a final question was asked: What would net profits have 
to have been to make the investment provisions operative at the margin? Obviously the tax exempted net profits had to 
be in this case at least as much or greater than realized investment. Only in this case could marginal investments be 
undertaken with an assurance that tax provisions could have played an important part in the realization of these 
spending decisions.  As noted earlier, the purpose of investment incentives is to attract these marginal investments, 
which could otherwise be lost if there is no margin for investment to be made cheaper. Net profits then are dependent 
on the percentage of available net profit allowances. In general, the minimum amount of net profits required to make 
allowances operative at the margin could be given by  
 
1( )NP I n  
 
where NP = net profits 
 I = gross investment, and  
 n = the available net profit allowance percentage. 
 
In case an investment allowance was provided with a net profit limitation, the previous relation may be 
interpreted by  
 
 1( )NP I n  
 
with λ  being the available percentage of investment allowance. Working with these two relations and under the 
specifications of various incentive laws, one can easily derive the required net profit figure that will assure operative 
tax provisions at the margin. These figures are presented in Columns 8 and 12 of Tables (3) and (4) respectively. Our 
profit figures from both procedures are indeed far less than the required amounts. Accepting the first procedure used 
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as the most correct, but feeling that a high percentage (90%) of general expenses to gross profits might have being 
used, it is even possible to show (see Columns 9, 10 and 11 of Table 3) by recalling the first procedure used, that to 
arrive at these required net profit figures this percentage had to be on average 58 per cent which is indeed much less 
than the assumed rate
17
. 
 
 
Table 4: 
Net Profits And Investment Expenditures – Comparison Procedure Two 
(In Million Drs, At Current prices) 
 
Year1 
 
Gross 
Investment 
Net profits (4) 
(2) 
% 
(5) 
Net 
Profit 
Allow- 
ances % 
(6) 
Tax Exempted 
Net Profits 
Investment  
Allowances 
Required 
Net 
Profits 
 
(12) 
GA2 
(1) 
TG2 
(2) 
GA 
(3) 
TG 
(4) 
GA 
(7) 
TG 
(8) 
% 
(9) 
Amount 
GA 
(10) 
TG 
(11) 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
  --- 
  --- 
  --- 
  926 
1147 
1395 
1782 
3913 
2122 
1872 
1823 
2385 
3603 
4485 
5101 
5512 
43863 
40783 
7803 
7479 
  --- 
  --- 
  --- 
  1342 
  1162 
  1333 
  2083 
  3027 
  2959 
  3268 
  8325 
  4475 
  4695 
  4511 
  5565 
  9094 
12036 
18201 
18593 
138053 
158713 
31250 
31790 
34025 
51618 
63798 
    289 
    322 
    477 
    593 
    649 
    779 
  1130 
  1303 
  1536 
  1405 
  1686 
  2658 
  4046 
  4914 
  6423 
11390 
  7855 
  8063 
  8658 
  7013 
  8302 
18744 
13106 
    307 
    342 
    534 
    651 
    714 
    861 
  1228 
  1409 
  1682 
  1573 
  1865 
  2857 
  4479 
  5347 
  7226 
13212 
  9213 
  9185 
10402 
  8719 
10153 
21822 
15585 
22.9 
29.5 
40.1 
31.2 
23.6 
29.1 
37.6 
16.9 
37.6 
33.5 
41.3 
51.3 
49.2 
44.4 
39.7 
71.1 
37.14 
34.44 
33.3 
27.4 
29.8 
42.3 
24.4 
  --- 
  50.0 
  50.0 
  50.0 
  50.0 
  50.0 
  50.0 
  50.0 
  50.0 
  50.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
   --- 
  50.0 
  50.0 
  --- 
  --- 
  40.0 
  40.0 
  40.0 
   --- 
  161 
  239 
  296 
  324 
  389 
  565 
  651 
  768 
  702 
1686 
2658 
4046 
4914 
6423 
  --- 
3928 
4032 
 
 
3321 
7498 
5242 
 
  171 
  267 
  326 
  357 
  431 
  614 
  705 
  841 
  787 
1865 
2857 
4479 
5347 
7226 
 --- 
4607 
4593 
 
 
4061 
8729 
6234 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40.0 
40.0 
 
 
25.0 
25.0 
25.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1755 
1631 
 
 
  --- 
  --- 
  --- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  5522 
  6348 
 
       
  8506 
12905 
15950 
 
  2324 
  2666 
  4166 
  6054 
  5918 
  6536 
16650 
  8950 
  9390 
  4511 
  5565 
  9094 
12036 
18201 
  --- 
11044 
12696 
  
 
21265 
32263 
39875 
 % Average    36.0        
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece, Annual Industrial Surveys, Athens, annual series, National tatistical Service of Greece, 
Declared Income Statistics of Legal Entities, Athens, annual series, and derivations described in text. 
_________________ 
1For profit figures this is the accounting year, i.e. the year profits were accrued.(Greek Statistics refer to fiscal year during which 
income returns are filed). 
2GA = Greater Athens, TG = Total Greece. 
3Refers to investment in equipment only. 
4Percentages refer to total investment. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The examination of the effect on investment of some main incentive measures provided by the Greek 
authorities over the past years, has shown that these measures had not much contribution in positively influencing the 
rate of investment expenditure. The fiscal variables used, according to the specifications of the neoclassical theory, 
were the rate of corporate taxation and the fiscal parameter  z  into which changes in depreciation policy and the 
various tax allowances in use during all this period were incorporated. The test of fiscal parameters on investment was 
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made for the two kinds of capital assets, equipment and structures, since expenditure on these two comprise on 
average an almost 85 per cent of total manufacturing investment in Greece. 
 
It was indicated that the corporate tax rate had remain almost constant over the period. In addition the value 
of  z,  incorporating depreciation allowances only, did not present any major variations for either equipment or 
structures. The inclusion of investment allowances (λ) in the value of  z  and for the representative firm appeared 
ineffective: it was shown that investment allowances were inoperative at the margin and on an aggregate level. Thus c, 
the user cost of capital variable, used in the neoclassical theory for tax incentives’ evaluation, is expected not to be 
affected much by tax provisions and in its turn may not affect decisively the desired level of capital stock and thus the 
amount of net investment.  
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 Excluding, in the above sense, the neoclassical theory as a source of study of the investment behavior in 
Greek manufacturing, our search for the appropriate model has to be directed towards other theories of the more ad 
hoc nature which incorporate measures of profits or the availability of internal funds as possible determinants of 
investment. These internal financing sources could enter in a properly specified investment function, either as 
determinants of the speed of adjustment of desired to actual capital stock or as determinants of the desired capital 
stock itself. The role of incentives then could be entered in the above framework as affecting the liquidity variables, 
and we could try to examine what this ‘liquidity’ effect of incentives could be, if any.  
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ENDNOTES 
 
1. See Hall (1977), Hall and Jorgenson (1967, 1969, 1971), Jorgenson and Siebert (1968), Jorgenson and 
Strevenson (1969). 
2. These rates have been derived by a very detailed and scrutinized research of  various incentive laws applied 
in Greece for an earlier three decade period (1950-1982).  We have chosen to report for this period since the 
very many incentive laws applied during Greece’s reconstruction (following 2nd World War) have provided 
for various incentive measures that can be researched as to the possibility of their application.  Recent 
incentive measures  that have been legislated are mainly capital related provisions and of the grant supporting  
style.  Incentive laws that have been searched for depreciation rate changes are: EL 942/1949, L 2901/1954, 
L 3765/1957, EL 147/1967, PD 88/1973, LD 1078/1971, L 1116/1981, L 1262/1982 (where L=Law, EL = 
Emergency Law, PD = Presidential Degree, LD =  Legislative Degree). 
3. See Coutsoumaris (1963), pp.133-137, for reasons of concentration in the Athens area, and Kottis (1980), pp. 
21-25. 
4. The relevant incentive laws which have been searched and refer to these provisions are: EL 942/1949, LD 
2176/1952, LD 3213/1955, LD 4002/1959, EL 147/1967, LD 1078/1971, LD 1212/1972, LD 1312/1972, LD 
1377/1973, L 331/1974, L 289/1976, L 849/1978, L 1116/1981, L 1262/1982. 
5. In fact the application of depreciation allowances alone were absorbing almost 70 per cent (buildings) or 80 
percent (equipment) from net profits, with little left to be taxed if no other allowances were in use.  Of course 
z refers to a present value of future deductions.  But as it will be seen later the amounts of investment 
expenditures undertaken during all these years were much higher than the amount of profits, and deductions 
on these investments for depreciation purposes were carried forward so in a specific year they were reducing 
(if not nullifying) substantially taxable profits. 
6. L 331/1974 provided for a 40% investment allowance during 1974 and 1975, L 849/1978 provided for a 25% 
investment allowance during 1978 and 1979, and L 1116/1981 provided for a 20% investment allowance 
during 1981 and up to 1985. 
7. See the later exposition for the operative (or inoperative) nature of investment allowances. 
8. See EL 147/1967 (Art.7), LD 1078/1971 (Art.3), LD 331/1974 (Art.1), L 289/1976(Art 4), L 849/1978 
(Art.2), L 1116/1981 (Art.17), L 1262/1982 (Art.3) 
9. These unpublished data were made available by the Center of Planning and Economic Research, Athens.  An 
amount ranging between 16% and 21% of labor remuneration was paid each year by employers during the 
1960-1980 period. 
10. See Federation of Greek Industries, The State of Greek Industry, Athens, annual series.  These series refer to 
a sample of manufacturing establishments operating under the legal form of Sociétés Anonymés 
(Corporations and Limited Liability Companies) whose Balance Sheets are published in the special bulletin 
of Government Gazette, in contrast to NSSG’s Surveys which cover total manufacturing irrespective of the 
legal form of each unit.  Given that the FGI series represent companies which produce around 85% of total 
manufacturing product, resort to these series could safely be made and no other data are available.  Reference 
to FGI series at present is made simply for the derivation of a relative percentage. 
11. The estimated regressions were  (GE) = -0.846 + 0.905 (GP), 
2
R  = 0.97, DW =  1.80 (-0.725) (26.010) and 
(GEMD) = -0.509 + 0.694 (GP), 
2
R  = 0.95, DW = 2.08 (-0.472) (20.028) where, numbers in parentheses are 
t-statistics, GE = general expenses, GP = gross profits, GEMD = general expenses minus depreciation, with 
data covering the 1957-1980 period expressed in million drs per firm.  The need to express the data per firm 
arose because the FGI sample varied during the period of investigation.  Sensitivity analysis for the first 
regression equation indicated that the 95% confidence interval for the true percentage of GE to GP lay 
between 0.832 and 0.972 but this could be due to the smallness of the sample. 
12. The estimated regression was DIV = 0.006 + 0.068 (GP), 
2
R  = 0.97, DW = 1.93 (0.079) (25.437) where 
numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, DIV = dividends and GP = gross profits, with data covering the 1957-
1980 period expressed in million drs per firm.  
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13. The use of the lower bound of the confidence interval for the true percentage of general expenses to gross 
profits (see endnote No 11) was checked and found to have no effect on the results and conclusions to follow. 
14. This specification is given in the NSSG’s statistical figures.  Within these amounts, the percentage of 
investment expenditures for used items is in fact very small. 
15.   Since it was supposed that the representative firm is situated in Area A, the 50 percent of investment 
deduction for Area A of LD 4002/1959 was applied to total Greece’s net profit figures.  The 100 percent 
investment deduction of EL 147/1967 was the same for all Areas.  The same procedure was followed for the 
investment allowances’ percentages.  
16.  See consecutive issues of NSSG, Declared Income Statistics of Legal Entities(1959-1980), Athens. 
17.  In fact it is even smaller than the 70 percent rate that was found when gross profits were related to general 
expenses before depreciation. 
 
 
NOTES 
